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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GENE VINCENT WOOD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20050647-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 77-
18a-l and § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). Other issues relating to jurisdiction are 
discussed below. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The threshold determination in Mr. Wood's appeal is whether he is 
precluded by the statutory and jurisdictional time limits from addressing issues that relate 
back to his 2002 plea and sentence? Said another way, does this Court have present 
jurisdiction over issues that pertain to claimed procedural and substantive errors which 
occurred in and around Mr. Wood's 2002 criminal proceedings? Questions of law are 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Benvenuto. 1999 UT 60, U 10, 983 P.2d 556. 
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PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
An "Anders" brief is filed because Mr. Wood's arguments have not been preserved. 
See Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738 (1967); State v. Clayton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 
1981). 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following relevant statutory provisions are contained in this brief 
or Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(e)(iii) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
Utah R. App. P. 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Statement of the Case, in terms relevant to this Court's ability to invoke 
jurisdiction over this matter, are summarized below. On or about February 20,2002, Mr. 
Wood entered a guilty plea to an amended Information which charged him with 
Manslaughter, a second degree felony. Due to a court order for a diagnostic evaluation 
and accompanying scheduling delays, Mr. Wood was not sentenced until July 31,2002. 
On that date, the Court sentenced Mr. Wood to an indeterminate term (1-15 years) of 
prison which was immediately suspended in favor of 365 days in jail, 36 months 
probation, and various terms and conditions of probation. 
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Mr. Wood1 did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, entered on February 20, 2002, 
within the mandated statutory time periods. Similarly, Mr. Wood did not file a notice of 
appeal for the sentence, entered on July 31, 2002, or for any other underlying issue within 
the statutory time period. 
On or about September 29, 2004, the court issued a $100,000 bench warrant in 
response to a progress-violation report concerning Mr. Wood. The court also set an Order 
to Show Cause proceeding to address the alleged violations which was eventually 
scheduled for March 4, 2005. 
On March 2, 2005, Mr. Wood filed a motion to withdraw his plea. During the 
Order to Show Cause hearing, held on March 4, 2005, in a passing reference the court 
suggested that the motion to withdraw was untimely albeit it did not definitively rule on 
the matter. The court did, however, accept Mr. Wood's three admissions that he had 
violated three terms of his probation and set sentencing on the matters for March 18, 
2005. At sentencing, the court revoked Mr. Wood's probation and sentenced him to the 
originally imposed indeterminate term of prison for manslaughter, a second degree 
felony. He then timely appealed the March 18, 2005, sentencing order on the order to 
show cause proceeding. 
1
 Depending on the context, many references to "Mr. Wood" actually pertain to the actions 
or inactions of Mr. Wood's counsel. Neither Mr. Wood, nor his trial counsel filed a motion to 
withdraw or a notice of appeal within the required statutory time periods. One issue now raised 
on appeal by Mr. Wood is that prior trial counsel was ineffective in failing to do so despite Mr. 
Wood's urging to the contrary. However, the jurisdictional bars still appear to preclude this 
Court's consideration of such an issue even if viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Wood. 
See infra Point I. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Wood advances many factual arguments including (but not limited to) actual 
innocence and claims relating to his (in)competency at the time he entered his guilty plea 
in 2002. There are also facts relating to legal issues including (but not limited to) 
evidentiary matters and ineffective assistance of counsel. A sample of such claims are 
contained in a letter to appellate counsel and attached as Addendum B. 
However, before such factual or legal allegations may be presented in a brief, this 
Court must first make a threshold determination as to whether Mr. Wood is 
jurisdictionally able to even raise his arguments in this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The issues Mr. Wood now seeks to raise are untimely for purposes of this direct 
appeal. Assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Wood's legal and factual challenges to his 2002 
plea or sentence have merit, the time to have made such challenges would have been 
within 30 days of the July 31, 2002, sentencing. This Court does not have jurisdiction 
over any issues other than the March 18, 2005, sentencing order on the order to show 
cause proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. WOOD IS JURISDICTIONALLY BARRED FROM 
RAISING ISSUES RELATED TO HIS ORIGINAL 2002 GUILTY PLEA. 
Pursuant to Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton. 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), appellate counsel for Mr. Wood files an "Anders" brief and seeks 
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permission from this Court to withdraw from the appeal.2 Alternatively, if this Court 
determines that an Anders brief should not have been filed, counsel requests guidance as 
to which issues are not jurisdictionally barred or wholly frivolous in order to raise them in 
a brief for Mr. Wood. 
Mr. Wood timely appealed the lower court's sentence, ordered on March 18, 2005, 
that revoked his probation and reimposed an indeterminate sentence of 1-15 years in 
prison. Mr. Wood's position on appeal does not focus on the validity of the court's March 
18, 2005, sentencing order. Indeed, after admitting to three probation violations during 
the March 4, 2005, order to show cause hearing, the lower court was legally entitled to 
revoke Mr. Wood's probation and reimpose the originally stayed prison term. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(iii) ("If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed."). The court's sentence 
following the order to show cause hearing was neither excessive nor illegal. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Wood's position on appeal appears to be that issues other than 
the appropriateness of the March 18, 2005, sentencing order may be addressed. In other 
words, Mr. Wood challenges, inter alia, whether his guilty plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered on February 20, 2002. There are a myriad of other issues that Mr. 
Wood would like this Court to consider, but all such issues relate to the 2002 proceedings 
and no such issue relates to the appropriateness of the March 18, 2005, sentencing order. 
2
 A separate motion to withdraw has been filed contemporaneously with the filing of 
this brief. 
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For purposes of this direct appeal, counsel assumes, arguendo, that Mr. Wood's 
contentions are factually and legally meritorious. 
However, even given such an assumption, at this time3 this Court appears 
jurisdictionally barred from considering Mr. Wood's meritorious arguments because they 
were not raised within the appropriate time periods. "The general rule applicable in 
criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the Appellant is 
deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby 
waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." 
See State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App.1988); State v. Lester Chet Thomas. 2005 
UT App 559, Case No. 20050936-CA, (filed December 22, 2005) (unpublished 
memorandum decision) (attached in Addendum C). Other rules apply equally to the 
limitations in this appeal. 
In order to withdraw a guilty plea, Mr. Wood was required to file a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea within thirty days of the entry of the plea. Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6. The Utah Supreme Court has held that failure to file a motion to withdraw the 
plea within the thirty day time period extinguishes a appellant's right to challenge the 
validity of the guilty plea on appeal. See State v. Abevta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) 
(noting that "the plea statute limits a defendant's right to withdraw his or her guilty plea to 
3
 Whether such issues may be more appropriately raised during a habeas corpus proceeding 
is not the issue in this direct appeal. Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(3) ("This section does 
not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure."). 
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thirty days after entry of the plea" and that "thereafter, the right is extinguished"); Utah R. 
App. P. 4 (an appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the final judgment or 
order); State v. Gary Lvnn Phillips, 2005 UT App. 560, Case No. 20050989-CA (filed 
December 22, 2005) (citation omitted) (unpublished memorandum decision) (attached in 
Addendum C) (The "30-day period for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case ... is 
jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this [c]ourt."). 
"Absent a timely motion to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack jurisdiction to 
consider any issue attacking the guilty plea itself, including whether a defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea agreement." State v. Connie Sue Lebow. 
2006 UT App 27, Case No. 200500611-CA (filed February 2, 2006) (unpublished 
memorandum decision) (attached in Addendum C). Consequently, the actions or 
inactions of prior trial counsel during the February 20, 2002, plea proceedings are not 
appropriate issues for this direct appeal, nor for a Rule 23B motion. 
These well-settled principles bind counsel, as an officer of the court, in his ability 
to raise Mr. Wood's desired issues. In accordance with Anders, however, "the court-not 
counsel-then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether 
the case is wholly frivolous." Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), cited in 
State v. Clavton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981). An independent review of the record by 
this Court is necessary to both safeguard Mr. Wood's interests and to confirm counsel's 
analysis. 
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Notwithstanding this Court independent review, Anders also requires that, "A copy 
of counsel's brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any 
points that he chooses." Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Clayton, 639 P.2d at 170. Counsel has 
told Mr. Wood in writing and in person of his intention to file an brief. He has forwarded 
Mr. Wood copies of analogous authority relevant to this appeal. To fulfill Anders 
requirements, counsel asks this Court to allow Mr. Wood time4 to raise any points that he 
chooses in furtherance of his appeal or to edit or omit any points contained in Addendum 
B. 
4
 A separate motion regarding the briefing schedule has been filed contemporaneously 
with the filing of this brief. 
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CONCLUSION 
By pleading guilty on February 20, 2002, Mr. Wood admitted all of the essential 
elements of his crime charged. All nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations, were waived by the plea. In addition, since there was no timely 
motion to withdraw the plea, nor any appeal of the originally imposed sentence, this Court 
is jurisdictionally barred from considering any issue relating to the 2002 proceedings 
SUBMITTED this ^C day of March, 2006. 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Attorney for Mr. Wood 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the original and seven 
copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. 
Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, four copies to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, and one copy to Mr. Gene Wood, Inmate 
#33040 at the Utah State Prison, this ?"? day of March, 2006. 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2002). Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown 
and with leave of the court, 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under Rule 
65B5 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e)(iii). Suspension of sentence - Pleas held in abeyance -
Probation ~ Supervision - Presentence investigation - Standards - Confidentiality ~ 
Terms and conditions - Termination, revocation, modification, or extension - Hearings 
- Electronic monitoring. 
(12)(e)(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l. Appeals - When proper. 
(1) A defendant may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of the 
defendant; 
(c) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a 
pending prosecution; or 
(d) an order denying bail, as provided in Subsection 77-20-1(7). 
(2) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (1), a defendant may seek 
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order. 
(3) The prosecution may, as a matter of right, appeal from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, including a dismissal of a felony 
information following a refusal to bind the defendant over for trial; 
(b) a pretrial order dismissing a felony charge on the ground that the court's 
suppression of evidence has substantially impaired the prosecution's case; 
(c) an order granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest; 
(d) an order arresting judgment or granting a motion for merger; 
(e) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(f) an order holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(g) an order adjudicating the defendant's competency to proceed further in a 
pending prosecution; 
(h) an order finding, pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 19, Part 2, Competency 
for Execution, that an inmate sentenced to death is incompetent to be 
executed; 
(i) an order reducing the degree of offense pursuant to Section 76-3-402; or 
(j) an illegal sentence. 
(4) In addition to any appeal permitted by Subsection (3), the prosecution may seek 
discretionary appellate review of any interlocutory order entered before jeopardy 
attaches. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
Utah R. App. P. 4 states, in pertinent part: "Appeal from final judgment and order. In a 
case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the 
appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." 
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Addendum C 
IN THE U'iV- AF PEALS 
,, ,-; /ou-
st ate of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Connie Sue Lebow, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication] 
Case v •nOr-Obil w * 
F 1 . .. D 
(February 2 
2006 UT App 27 
Seventh District, Monticello Dej, 
The Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
Attorneys: William L. Schultz, Moab, i_.,. AppeilaiiL 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before J udges Greenwood, Mc :Hi lgl I ai id 0 t: me . 
PER CURIAM: 
Connie Sue Lebow appeals her conviction on a drug charge 
after pleading guilty. This is before the court on Lebow's 
motion for a remand pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
23B and on the State's motion for summary disposition based on 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Although Lebow pleaded guilty and seeks tc. attack char p'..ea 
on appeal, albeit on a theory of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, she did not file a motion to withdraw her plea in the 
district court. Her failure to timely file a motion to withdraw 
her plea bars this court from considering her challenge to the 
validity of her plea on appeal. 
Pursuant to Utah Code section 77-13-6, 
a guilty plea must be made by a motion filed 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (b) (2003) 
file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "ext 
defendant's right to challenge the validity 
appeal." State v. Reves, 2 002 UT 13,1(3, 4 0 
State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d 585 ( 
limit in section 77-13-6 is jurisdictional). 
motion to withdraw a plea, appellate courts 
a request to withdraw 
prior to sentencing. 
The failure to t ime 1 y 
inguishes a 
of the guilty plea on 
P.3d 630; see also, 
holding the time 
Absent a timely 
lack, j u r i s d i c t :i on t o 
consider any issue attacking the guilty plea itself, including 
whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in 
the plea agreement. See Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at 1M[17-19; State v. 
Melo, 2001 UT App 392,116-8, 4 0 p-3d 646- Because Lebow failed 
to timely move to withdraw her guilty plea, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider her claim that she received ineffective 
assistance of counsel in connection with her plea. Lebow has not 
raised any other issue that this court may review. 
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, based on the dismissal, Lebow's 
motion for remand is denied as moot. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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••'• •.-.• IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaint i f f and Appel.3 ee , 
v. 
Gary Lynn T - • T>S, 
Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
r-,se >: -C050989-CA 
F I , .. D 
(December 2..... 20 0'5) 
2005 UT App 560 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
114 I '104 4 / 
Attorneys: Josie E. Brumfield, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris C. Leonard, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before J udges Dav is, I I- : Hi lgl i < : ' ',. ' . • ' 
PER CURIAM: 
Q a ry Lynn Phillips appeals from the district court's post-
sentencing judgment and commitment. This matter is before the 
court on its own motion for summary disposition on the basis that 
the grounds for appeal are so insubstantial as not to merit 
further proceedings or consideration. 
On December 7, 2004, Phillips pleaded guilty to possession 
of a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). See Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2005). The district court entered 
Phillips's sentence on February 1, 2005, and subsequently entered 
a post-sentencing judgment and commitment on September 12, 
thereby terminating Phillips's probation. 
Phillips did not file a notice of appea] from the sentence, 
judgment, and commitment entered in this case. Instead, Phil] i ps 
appealed only from the post-sentence judgment and commitment. 
Although the appeal from the post-sentence judgment was timely, 
it is clear that Phillips raises no issues that pertain to th:i s 
particular order. To the contrary, Phillips argues generally 
that his right to a speedy trial was denied under Utah Code 
section 77-1-6(3 ) (f) . .See Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (f) (2003) . 
This argument clearly relates to the original sentence, judgment, 
and commitment. 
An appeal must be filed within thirty days from the entry of 
a final judgment or order. See Utah R. App. P. 4. In a criminal 
case, it is "the sentence itself which constitutes a final 
judgment from which the appellant has the right to appeal." 
State v. Bower, 2002 UT 100,1(4, 57 P.3d 1065; see also State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978). The "30-day period for 
filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case . . . is 
jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this [c]ourt." State v. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah 1981). 
Due to Phillips's untimely appeal, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to determine the issue on appeal — Phillips' s right 
to a speedy trial. See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97,111, 37 P.3d 
1070.' 
Because this court has determined that no substantial 
question over which it has jurisdiction is presented, the 
judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
xEven if this court had jurisdiction over the issue, it is 
clear that by pleading guilty, Phillips waived his right to a 
speedy trial. See United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (holding that the right to a speedy trial is 
nonjurisdictional); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 
1989) ("[B]y pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have 
admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and 
thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged 
pre-plea constitutional violations."). 
20050989-CA 2 
TN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
----00O00-- -
S i d l e s i Ul Jli ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not F o r O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
C a s e Ni 2 0 Q S 0 9 3 6 - C A 
F 1 11 1 U 
( D e c e m b e r 2 2 , 2 0 05) 
2 0 0 5 UT App 5 5 9 
P l a i n t i t f a n d A p p e l l e e , 
v . 
1J<- bt e ) < 1liM J In nihil 
Defendant and Appellant ) 
Fourth District, Provo Depai t IIH nt t)4HtL I '3 
The Honorable Samuel McVey 
Hiorueys- Sheldon R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Matthew D. Bates, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
F t I t n ( i l u d c p * 11 p i I h H i i q l i n I i i IIK 
PER CURIAM: 
Lester Chet Thomas appeals from his conviction on druy 
possession charges. This is before the court on its own motion 
for summary disposition. Thomas did not respond to the motion. 
In his docketing statement, Thomas identifies the issue on 
appeal as whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress evidence. However, Thomas did not file a motion to 
suppress in the underlying case below, although he did file such 
a motion in a related case. Furthermore, Thomas pleaded guilty 
unconditionally to the charge, thus waiving his right to 
challenge the admissibility of evidence. A guilty plea 
constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional 
issues. See State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). The general rule in criminal proceedings is that by 
pleading guilty, a defendant is deemed to have admitted all of 
the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives 
all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 
1?7^ (Utah 1989) 
Thomas's guilty plea extinguished his right to challenge the 
admissibility of evidence on appeal No uthei issue has Intn 
identified. As a result, there is no substantial question for 
review warranting further consideration by this court. 
Accordingly, Thomas's conviction is affirmed. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
20050936-CA 2 
